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 The Weinstein Tax: Congress’ 
Attempt to Curb Non-Disclosure 




The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act has been hailed by many as both a significant and 
sensible tax reform. It lowered the U.S.’s notoriously high corporate tax rates 
while also providing a tax break for many individual Americans. Although this tax 
reform has its benefits, this article discusses a troubling provision that has not 
garnered much attention. This particular provision, incorporated into the Internal 
Revenue Code as § 162(q), does not allow the deduction of settlement or attor-
neys’ fees in sexual harassment cases when a settlement is subject to a non-
disclosure agreement. Although the intention of this reform was to protect victims 
of sexual harassment, the statutory language actually harms victims in a number 
of ways. Congress has recognized some of these issues, but unfortunately it does 
not understand the full scope of the problem. This ultimately leaves victims in 
harm’s way as efforts to correct the legislation have stalled. This article addresses 
the three significant problems with § 162(q) and proposes potential solutions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Harvey Weinstein is one of many names to have fallen from grace as the 
#MeToo movement has revealed an ugly side of American business.1 Individuals 
exposed have ranged from once endearing figures like Bill Cosby,2 to highly rated 
TV personalities like Bill O’Reilly.3 Americans have watched in horror as they 
discovered Harvey Weinstein alone had 87 accusers;4 Bill Cosby’s trail of victims 
spanned more than half a century;5 and Bill O’Reilly’s settlements topped $45 
million.6 Many people have wondered how such large groups of victims could 
remain silent for such a long period of time.7 The sad truth is that lawyers advising 
these unsavory characters required victims to enter into non-disclosure agreements 
(“NDAs”) as a condition to settlement.8 These agreements, usually structured as 
gag orders, enabled these men to force victims to remain quiet or risk paying a 
large sum in liquidated damages if the harassment was disclosed.9 
Although a few states tried to correct this injustice by passing legislation pro-
hibiting the use of NDAs in sexual harassment cases,10 the vast majority have not 
acted.11 With the growing momentum of the #MeToo movement, Congress at-
tempted to limit the use of NDAs in sexual harassment settlements. 12 One reform 
in particular, passed by Congress and signed into law by President Trump in De-
cember of 2017, was the landmark Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (“TCJA”).13 With this 
reform passing on the heels of the Harvey Weinstein scandal, many commentators 
have referred to it as the “Weinstein tax.”14 
                                                          
 1. Frankie Shaw, 263 celebrities, politicians, CEOs, and others who have been accused of sexual 
misconduct since April 2017, VOX (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.vox.com/a/sexual-harassment-assault-
allegations-list. 
 2. Kyle Kim et al., Bill Cosby: A 50-year chronicle of accusations and accomplishments, SAN 
DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Sept. 25, 2018, 11:34 AM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/la-
et-bill-cosby-timeline-htmlstory.html. 
 3. Michelle Ruiz, Bill O’Reilly’s Sexual Harassment Settlements Are Even Uglier Than We 
Thought, VOGUE (Apr. 5, 2018, 11:57 AM), https://www.vogue.com/article/bill-oreilly-sexual-
harassment-settlement-news. 
 4. Sara M Moniuszko & Cara Kelly, Harvey Weinstein scandal: A complete list of the 87 accusers, 
USA TODAY (Oct. 27, 2017, 4:51 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/people/2017/10/27/weinstein-scandal-complete-list-
accusers/804663001/. 
 5. Kim, supra note 2. 
 6. Ruiz, supra note 3. 
 7. See Nicole Karlis, How non-disclosure agreements silence victims, SALON (Dec. 10, 2017, 4:00 
PM), https://www.salon.com/2017/12/10/how-non-disclosure-agreements-silence-victims/. 
 8. See Nondisclosure Agreements: What Are They, and How Do They Work in Sexual Harassment 
Cases?, THE SPIGGLE LAW FIRM (last visited Apr. 6, 2019), https://www.spigglelaw.com/employment-
blog/nondisclosure-agreements-work-sexual-harassment-cases/. 
 9. See id. 
 10. Jonathan Ence, “I Like You When You Are Silent”: The Future of NDAs and Mandatory Arbitra-
tion in the Era of #MeToo, U. MO. J. OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 165, 174 (2019). 
 11. Associated Press, States move to limit workplace confidentiality agreements, CBS NEWS (Aug. 
27, 2018, 8:39 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/states-move-to-limit-workplace-confidentiality-
agreements/. 
 12. Id.; Ence, supra note 10, at 172. 
 13. Louise Radnofsky, Trump Signs Sweeping Tax Overhaul Into Law, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL 
(Dec. 22, 2017, 11:45 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-signs-sweeping-tax-overhaul-into-
law-1513959753. 
 14. The “Weinstein Tax” and the Unintended Consequences of Congress’ Response To the #MeToo 
Movement, GORDON & REES (Feb. 2018), https://www.gordonrees.com/publications/2018/the-
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A social reform of this nature being incorporated into a tax reform bill may 
strike some as odd, but this is not the first time that Congress has encouraged so-
cial reforms in this way.15 The reform itself, codified in § 162(q) of the Internal 
Revenue Code (the “Code”), prohibits the deduction of “any settlement or pay-
ment related to sexual harassment,” including attorneys’ fees, when an NDA is 
used.16 Although NDAs can still be used, savvy employers will think twice before 
including them in settlements—especially when there are large payouts. For in-
stance, in Fox News’ $20 million settlement with Gretchen Carlson for sexual 
harassment by CEO Roger Ailes, the effect of § 162(q) would have been an in-
crease in the corporation’s taxes by $4.2 million from the settlement alone.17 
The incorporation of this section into the TCJA was unlikely for multiple rea-
sons. The first surprise was that the amendment, proposed by a Democrat, sur-
vived the scrutiny of a Republican-led committee.18 Although Republicans are 
generally resistant to workplace and social reforms like these, the amendment was 
incorporated into the final draft of the bill.19 What is even more surprising is the 
legislator who introduced the amendment, Senator Bob Menendez (D–NJ).20 Of 
all the Democrats to support the #MeToo agenda, Senator Menendez is not partic-
ularly well known for supporting women’s rights on a personal level. For exam-
ple, there appears to be corroborating evidence that he was having sex with under-
age prostitutes as part of his recent corruption investigation.21 This ultimately led 
to a severe admonishment by the Senate Ethics Committee and an indictment for 
bribery charges by federal prosecutors.22 
                                                          
weinstein-tax-and-the-unintended-consequences-of-congress-response-to-the-metoo-movement; Rob-
ert W. Wood, Ironically, Weinstein Tax On Sexual Harassment Settlements May Hurt Plaintiffs Too, 
FORBES (Jan. 3, 2018, 8:51 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2018/01/03/ironically-
weinstein-tax-on-sexual-harassment-settlements-may-hurt-plaintiffs-too/#27296a8f463d [hereinafter 
Wood, Weinstein Tax May Hurt Plaintiffs]. 
 15. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 132 (2018). 
 16. 26 U.S.C. § 162(q) (2017). 
 17. Assuming a flat corporate tax rate of 21%, multiplied by the settlement amount of $20 million, 
equals $4.2 million. Although taxes are not directly increased this much, it will have the same effect by 
denying the $20 million as a deductible business expense; Bill Chappell, Fox Will Pay Gretchen Carl-
son $20 Million To Settle Sexual Harassment Suit, NPR (Sept. 6, 2016, 9:42 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/09/06/492797695/fox-news-will-pay-gretchen-carlson-
20-million-to-settle-sexual-harassment-suit. 
 18. CONG. RES. SERV., SENATE COMMITTEE PARTY RATIOS: 98TH-116TH CONGRESSES 5 (2019), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34752.pdf. 
 19. Republican Party, HISTORY (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.history.com/topics/us-
politics/republican-party. 
 20. Legal Alert: Section 162(q) Raises Questions about Deductibility of Employment Settlements, 
EVERSHEDS SUTHERLAND (Dec. 27, 2017), https://us.eversheds-
sutherland.com/NewsCommentary/Legal-Alerts/207305/Legal-AlertSection-162q-Raises-Questions-
about-Deductibility-of-Employment-Settlements. 
 21. Steven Nelson, Feds Say ‘Corroborating Evidence’ Backed Menendez Prostitution Claims, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/08/24/feds-
say-corroborating-evidence-backed-menendez-prostitution-claims. 
 22. Matt Apuzzo, Senator Robert Menendez Indicted on Corruption Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/02/nyregion/senator-robert-menendez-indicted-on-
corruption-charges.html?action=click&module=RelatedCoverage&pgtype=Article&region=Footer; 
Devlin Barrett et al., Justice Department says it will retry Sen. Robert Menendez following mistrial on 
bribery charges, WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 19, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-department-says-it-will-re-try-sen-
robert-menendez-following-mistrial-on-bribery-charges/2018/01/19/240fce5c-fd51-11e7-a46b-
a3614530bd87_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.bfb9614616d7; Herb Jackson, Ethics committee 
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Regardless of the law’s origin, its tax implications are certain to impact how 
sexual harassment settlements are structured. Although tax reforms do not require 
changed behavior, ignoring the behaviors can hit people where it hurts most—
their wallets. While the initial reaction to the law was quite positive, a growing 
number of people doubt its effectiveness.23 Some experts have pointed out the 
potential for negative tax and privacy consequences to victims, as well as unnec-
essary gray areas of the law that might lead to litigation.24 Both of these are con-
cerns that Congress does not seem to have contemplated when the law was 
passed.25 
Part II of this article provides a brief history of NDAs and illustrates how they 
have been used to constrain victims of sexual harassment. Part III discusses the 
text of § 162(q) and highlights the three major concerns with the law’s text. Part 
IV brings to light an additional concern with § 162(q) as it interacts with new 
TCJA reforms. Part V identifies instances where this reform has started to change 
corporate behavior and speculates about the law’s overall effectiveness. Part VI 
highlights the solutions that would make this a truly effective tax reform. Part V 
concludes. 
II. NON-DISCLOSURE AGREEMENTS – THEN AND NOW 
NDAs started becoming prevalent in businesses as early as the 1940s.26 At-
torneys used them to help safeguard companies’ valuable trade secrets from com-
petitors.27 Although companies could not control employee turnover, NDAs 
helped ensure the confidentiality of company information by making employees 
personally liable if they violated the agreement.28 The use of NDAs in these situa-
tions generally made sense and were not controversial.29 However, beginning in 
the 1980s, NDAs began to creep into an ever-increasing number of contracts, 
including standard settlement agreements.30 Although there was no federal re-
sponse addressing secrecy in settlements,31 some states began passing sunshine-in-
litigation statutes prohibiting NDAs in certain instances.32 For example, Florida’s 
                                                          
admonishes Sen. Bob Menendez over taking gifts, advocating for donor, USA TODAY (Apr. 26, 2018, 
4:54 PM), https://www.northjersey.com/story/news/new-jersey/2018/04/26/ethics-committee-
admonishes-sen-bob-menendez-over-taking-gifts-advocating-donors/555685002/. 
 23. See Trey Cooper, Tax Cuts and Jobs Act Limits Business Expense Deduction for Settlement of 
Sexual Harassment Claims, ARK. LAW. 32, 33 (2018); Robert W. Wood, Tax Write-Offs in Sexual 
Harassment Cases After Harvey Weinstein, N.Y. ST. B.J. 10, 13 (Feb. 2010), 
http://www.woodllp.com/Publications/Articles/pdf/Tax_Write-Offs_NYSBA.pdf [hereinafter Wood, 
Tax Write-Offs After Weinstein]. 
 24. Cooper, supra note 23, at 33; Wood, Tax Write-Offs After Weinstein, supra note 23, at 13–14. 
 25. Cooper, supra note 23, at 32–33; Wood, Tax Write-Offs After Weinstein, supra note 23, at 12–
13. 
 26. Michelle Dean, Contracts of Silence, CJR (2018), https://www.cjr.org/special_report/nda-
agreement.php/. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Alison Lothes, Quality, Not Quantity: An Analysis of Confidential Settlements and Litigants’ 
Economic Incentives, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 433, 442 (2005). 
 32. See e.g., FLA. STAT. § 69.081 (1999); Ronald L. Burdge, Confidentiality in Settlement Agree-
ments is Bad for Clients, Bad for Lawyers, Bad for Justice, A.B.A. (Nov. 1, 2012), 
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law prohibits NDAs that conceal a public hazard or information which could help 
the public protect themselves.33 Although it would appear that Harvey Weinstein 
and other repeat offenders would fall under the definition of a “public hazard,” 
courts have yet to apply statutes like this to NDAs in sexual harassment cases.34 
For attorneys, there is no secret sauce to create an NDA, as these agreements 
are governed by contract law.35 This allows each NDA to be tailored to the facts 
of the case at hand. Each NDA varies in how much information the parties restrict, 
what (if any) disclosure is permitted, and the amount of liquidated damages if a 
breach occurs.36 Although NDAs are usually structured as bilateral (meaning they 
bind both parties), they can also be set up as unilateral, where only one party is 
restricted from disclosure.37 
In recent years, attorneys have crafted NDAs that are increasingly restrictive 
for the victims of sexual harassment. Highly unusual requirements exposed in the 
NDA between Mr. Weinstein and his former assistant, Zelda Perkins, required that 
her doctor and family members sign separate NDAs before she could discuss any 
of the harassment with them.38 Additionally, the agreement limited the scope of 
her testimony if there was a criminal trial, and even barred her from possessing a 
copy of the agreement itself.39 Details from the NDAs entered into by Bill 
O’Reilly and his victims were just as shocking, requiring them to forfeit their 
diaries, photos, and e-mails relating to the harassment.40 It even forced victims to 
lie if asked about the incident by “disclaim[ing] ‘as counterfeit or forgeries’” any 
materials made public.41 
III. THE NEW LEGISLATION 
A. The Purpose of I.R.C. § 162(q) 
These recent examples highlight how NDAs have morphed from instruments 
that protect business trade secrets into gag orders that benefit the powerful and 
corrupt. Congress heard the public outcry against this perversion of NDAs and 
                                                          
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/gpsolo/publications/gp_solo/2012/november_december2012priva
cyandconfidentiality/confidentiality_settlement_agreements_is_bad_clients_lawyers_justice/. 
 33. See, e.g., Ray Shaw, Sunshine in Litigation, THE FLORIDA BAR (last visited Apr. 6, 2019), 
https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-journal/sunshine-in-litigation/. 
 34. Alexander Dudley, It’ll Be Our Little Secret: A Look into the Legality & Enforceability of Non-
disclosure Agreements in Sexual Assault and Harassment Cases, U. OF MIAMI L. REV. (June 30, 2018), 
https://lawreview.law.miami.edu/itll-secret-legality-enforceability-nondisclosure-agreements-sexual-
assault-harassment-cases/. 
 35. Joe R. Thompson, Overview of Confidentiality Agreements, IOWA STATE UNIV. (updated Sept. 
2013), https://www.extension.iastate.edu/agdm/wholefarm/html/c5-80.html. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Catherine Bragg, Non-Disclosure Agreements in Review, A.B.A. (Aug. 20, 2019), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/construction_industry/publications/under_construction/2019/sum
mer2019/non_disclosure_agreement/. 
 38. Stacy Perman, #MeToo law restricts use of nondisclosure agreements in sexual misconduct 
cases, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Dec. 31, 2018, 3:00 AM), 
https://www.latimes.com/business/hollywood/la-fi-ct-nda-hollywood-20181231-story.html. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Andrew Kirell, Bill O’Reilly Harassment Settlement Deal Required His Accusers to Lie, DAILY 
BEAST (Apr. 4, 2018, 3:48 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/bill-oreilly-harassment-settlement-
deal-required-his-accusers-to-lie. 
 41. Id. 
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decided to enact legislation to discourage it.42 The law itself, § 162(q), states that 
“[n]o deduction shall be allowed under this chapter for—(1) any settlement 
or payment related to sexual harassment or sexual abuse if such settlement 
or payment is subject to a nondisclosure agreement, or (2) attorneys’ fees related 
to such a settlement or payment.”43 
In theory, this legislation will increase taxes on businesses by denying what is 
normally deductible as an ordinary and necessary trade or business expense.44 
Taxable income is defined as gross income minus deductions.45 By denying a 
deduction for expenses relating to sexual harassment as a trade or business ex-
pense, a company will have a higher taxable income, leading to more taxes.46 On 
its face this appears to be a good deterrent to limit the use of NDAs in sexual har-
assment cases. Although this legislation does not influence all settlements, it will 
surely impact savvy businesses who make tax-conscious decisions. Some critics, 
however, find this reform wholly insufficient.47 Instead, they believe NDAs 
should be banned in all sexual harassment settlements.48 Although some states 
may choose to provide more restrictive regulations on sexual harassment NDAs, 
the current tax reform is the first national reform of its kind.49 The reform may not 
completely prohibit NDAs in sexual harassment cases, but it at least “raises the 
price of secrecy” and will hopefully change the current trend to favor victims.50 
B. Unintended Consequences 
At first blush, the legislation appears to be a simple solution to a simple prob-
lem—all NDAs are bad, and their use should be discouraged. Although disincen-
tivizing the use of NDAs as gag orders is a step in the right direction, this legisla-
tion fails miserably in other areas because of its unintended consequences. First, 
the law appears to deny the deduction of attorneys’ fees to both plaintiffs and 
defendants if there is an NDA.51 To victims, this would be a negative tax conse-
quence that did not exist before the law.52 Second, the legislation fails to consider 
that NDAs could be used to protect victims’ privacy; instead, it makes the as-
sumption that all NDAs are harmful to victims.53 Third, language in the statute 
identifying what payments this applies to, as well as other key terms, were never 
defined. 54 This leads to needless uncertainty for taxpayers, who may have to bear 
the cost of litigation. Although Congress has started taking some steps to correct 
this statute, it seems to be aware of only a fraction of the issues that this legisla-
                                                          
 42. See 26 U.S.C. § 162(q) (2017). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. 26 U.S.C. § 63(a) (2018). 
 46. See id. 
 47. See Michelle Kaminsky, The Harvey Weinstein Effect: The End of Nondisclosure Agreements In 
Sexual Assault Cases?, FORBES (Oct. 26, 2017, 1:00 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michellefabio/2017/10/26/the-harvey-weinstein-effect-the-end-of-
nondisclosure-agreements-in-sexual-assault-cases/#4f78ee4d2c11. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Ence, supra note 10, at 166; Associated Press, supra note 11. 
 50. Margaret Ryznar, #METOO & TAX, 75 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. Online 53, 56–57 (2018). 
 51. See I.R.C. § 162(q) (2017). 
 52. Ryznar, supra note 50, at 59. 
 53. See I.R.C. § 162(q) (2017). 
 54. Id. 
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tion poses.55 If an amendment to the TCJA is going to be made, the amendment 
should consider all of these issues, not only the glaring problems. Each of these 
unintended consequences is discussed in more detail below. 
i. Deductibility of Attorneys’ Fees 
Section 162(q)(2) states that “[n]o deduction shall be allowed under this chap-
ter for . . . attorney’s fees related to such a settlement.”56 The implication is that it 
prohibits both parties in a settlement from deducting attorneys’ fees if an NDA is 
used. Normally, victims would take an above-the-line deduction for attorney fees 
paid in sexual harassment cases;57 however, this is a gray area of law that will be 
discussed at length below.58 So, if victims use the above-the-line deduction, they 
would have to pay taxes on only the proceeds that they actually receive from the 
settlement.59 Although the legislators intended for this law to prohibit the harasser 
or employer from deducting its attorney fees,60 the plain language of the statute 
appears to deny the deduction to victims as well.61 
If an NDA was included, the result of this legislative error could result in a 
particularly punishing tax bill for victims. For example, take the settlement dis-
cussed earlier between Fox News and Gretchen Carlson for $20 million.62 Assum-
ing the damages she recovered were not derived from a physical injury,63 the en-
tire settlement amount would be taxable.64 Applying Carlson’s individual tax rates 
generates a federal income tax bill of $7.9 million.65 Then assume that one-third of 
the settlement amount, $6.7 million, pays for attorneys’ fees. This leaves her with 
a comparatively small take-home amount of $5.5 million out of a $20 million 
settlement. However, if the attorneys’ fees were taken as an above-the-line deduc-
tion, the tax bill would be lowered from $7.8 million to $5.2 million, allowing the 
victim to pocket an extra $2.6 million. As practitioners have already noticed, the 
sad truth is that victims subject to an NDA are actually “in a worse position finan-
cially than they were before passage of the [TCJA].”66 
                                                          
 55. See, e.g., Letter from the U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin. to Steven Mnuchin, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t 
Treasury & David Kautter, Acting Comm’r, Internal Revenue Serv. (Aug. 16, 2018), (on file with 
author) [hereinafter Letter]. 
 56. I.R.C. § 162(q) (2017). 
 57. Wood, Tax Write-Offs After Weinstein, supra note 23, at 13. 
 58. See infra Part IV. 
 59. Cooper, supra note 23, at 33. 
 60. Wood, Tax Write-Offs After Weinstein, supra note 23, at 13. 
 61. See I.R.C. § 162(q) (2017). 
 62. Chappell, supra note 17. 
 63. Although Carlson has identified Roger Ailes as her harasser, she has not spoken about details of 
the harassment because of the NDA. Michelle Chen, How Forced Arbitration and Non-Disclosure 
Agreements Can Perpetuate Hostile Work Environments, THE NATION (Nov. 30, 2017), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/how-forced-arbitration-and-non-disclosure-agreements-can-
perpetuate-hostile-work-environments/. Because these details are lacking it is unknown if part of her 
injuries are arguably physical. See id. Sexual harassment is not presumed to be a physical injury unless 
it meets certain criteria. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2018). 
 64. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2018). 
 65. See I.R.C. § 1 (2017). 
 66. Cooper, supra note 23, at 33.; See Wood, Tax Write-Offs After Weinstein, supra note 23, at 13. 
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Lawmakers were fairly quick to realize this gaping error in the new law.67 
Senator Menendez, who proposed the amendment, issued a public statement the 
day after the TCJA passed Congress. 68 He described the potential consequences 
discussed above as “outrageous and maddening,” quickly pointing blame at Re-
publicans on the Senate Finance Committee for the final wording.69 In the follow-
ing months, Republicans on the Senate Finance Committee penned an open letter 
to the Department of Treasury and Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) acknowledg-
ing the mistake.70 The purpose of the letter was an attempt to clarify that Con-
gress’ “legislative intent” was not to prohibit the deduction of victims’ attorneys’ 
fees.71 Despite Congressional efforts to correct this problem, the IRS may still be 
forced to prohibit the deduction by victims, as they “cannot interpret [text] in a 
manner contrary to [the] plain language of the statute.”72 As for now, the IRS has 
yet to issue any guidance for taxpayers on their official interpretation of the law.73 
ii. No Consideration of Unilateral NDAs that Protect Vic-
tims 
The second mistake—which lawmakers have yet to acknowledge—is that the 
reform does not consider that victims could benefit from NDAs to protect their 
privacy.74 Although some victims may be comfortable with their harassment be-
coming public knowledge, others prefer privacy. An attorney who has represented 
victims in these types of settlement negotiations explained that clients often have a 
“fear of being retaliated against or ostracized by their employers, potential 
future employers and even entire industries.”75 Some victims even worry 
about it bleeding over into their personal lives, “[affecting] how their 
friends and family might treat them … or [that they] might … suffer from 
unwanted attention.”76 Although this legislation helps prevent NDAs from 
being forced on victims, Congress did not anticipate that it would force 
victims to choose between the value of privacy and a smaller tax bill. 
If a victim wants to include an NDA as part of a settlement agreement, 
the same tax consequences will occur as if the employer forced the NDA 
on the victim.77 The first consequence, that neither party will be able to 
                                                          
 67. Press Release, Senator Bob Menendez, Menendez Calls on GOP to Fix its Tax Bill to Protect 
Victims of Workplace Sexual Misconduct (Dec. 21, 2017) (on file with author) [hereinafter Menendez 
Statement]. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Letter, supra note 55. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Lawmakers explain TCJA errors & request that IRS guidance reflect Congressional intent 
pending correction, THOMSON REUTERS TAX & ACCT., Aug. 20, 2018, 2018 WL 3969468 (RIA). 
 73. Although the IRS has acknowledged this reform, it has not issued guidance on its website. See 
Certain payments related to sexual harassment and sexual abuse, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/settlement-of-attorneys-fees-related-to-sexual-harassment (last updated 
Mar. 22, 2019). 
 74. See Menendez Statement, supra note 67. 
 75. Areva Martin, How NDAs Help Some Victims Come Forward Against Abuse, TIME (Nov. 28, 
2017), http://time.com/5039246/sexual-harassment-nda/. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See I.R.C. § 162(q) (2017). 
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deduct attorney fees related to the settlement, has already been discussed.78 
This is a direct negative tax consequence for both parties and will discour-
age victims from seeking NDAs, even for their own privacy. The second 
consequence is that the employer will not be able to deduct “any settle-
ment or payment related to sexual harassment” as a business expense.79 
The word “any” is all encompassing, and will likely be interpreted as such, re-
gardless of who the NDA benefits.80 Although this is only a direct negative 
tax consequence to the employer, it will significantly impact victims if 
they are the only party seeking an NDA. 
Anytime an employer is considering settling a sexual harassment case, it will 
likely complete some type of a cost-benefit analysis to help determine whether to 
include an NDA in the settlement.81 This would consist of weighing each option 
and determining which is less costly.82 If the projected taxes are greater than the 
projected consequences of public disclosure of the sexual harassment, then the 
company would opt not to include an NDA.83 The problem is that victims who 
desire an NDA for privacy are now forced to try and bargain with an employer 
who does not want to include an NDA, because it is contrary to the employer’s 
best interest. In these situations, a victim’s bargaining power is decreased because 
they will likely have to compromise on a reduced settlement amount to offset the 
employer’s increased tax burden.84 This tax reform is particularly troubling if one 
considers a situation where a harasser/employer threatens to humiliate the victim 
by leaking embarrassing facts. Although disclosure of sexual harassment claims 
can be a good thing for the public, this law does not fully consider what is in the 
best interest of victims.85 
Although statutory language would likely have to be amended to remedy this 
problem, there is at least one simple solution. As mentioned above, NDAs can be 
either bilateral or unilateral.86 Congress should have allowed for unilateral NDAs 
that protect victims from unwanted disclosure. Then, the adverse tax consequenc-
es would be triggered by either bilateral or unilateral NDAs that protect the em-
ployer. At a minimum this would stop the victim’s bargaining power from being 
further diminished if they insisted on an NDA for their own privacy. 
As the law currently stands, the adverse tax consequences to the employer if 
there is an NDA is calculated as the settlement amount plus attorney fees multi-
plied by the employer’s marginal tax rate.87 Building from the earlier example of 
the settlement between Fox News and Gretchen Carlson, Fox would multiply the 
$20 million settlement by a flat corporate tax rate of 21%.88 In this case, the effect 
of including an NDA for the benefit of the employer would be approximately $4.2 
                                                          
 78. Id.; see supra Part III(B)(i). 
 79. I.R.C. § 162(q). 
 80. See Wood, Weinstein Tax May Hurt Plaintiffs, supra note 14. 
 81. Cost-benefit analysis, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cost%E2%80%93benefit_analysis (last updated Mar. 21, 2019). 
 82. Id. 
 83. See id. 
 84. Bargaining power, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bargaining_power (last updated 
Feb. 8, 2018). 
 85. See Wood, Weinstein Tax May Hurt Plaintiffs, supra note 14; see I.R.C. § 162(q) (2017). 
 86. Non-disclosure agreement, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-disclosure_agreement 
(last updated Mar. 31, 2019). 
 87. See I.R.C. § 162(q). 
 88. I.R.C. § 11(b) (2017). 
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million. Assuming that Fox News is aware of these tax consequences, it would 
likely require that the settlement be reduced by this amount if Carlson demands a 
unilateral NDA to protect herself. Also assuming that one-third of the settlement 
will go towards paying attorneys’ fees, which she is now unable to deduct, Carl-
son would take home approximately $4.2 million from a settlement valued by the 
employer at $20 million.89 Clearly, the winner in this scenario is the IRS, who 
would pocket a whopping $9.6 million from the transaction ($3.3 million from the 
increased corporate tax, and $6.3 million from the victim). 
Bargaining to offset such a large tax increase for the employer puts victims in 
an unfavorable position to bargain. To make matters worse, employers generally 
have stronger bargaining power in settlement negotiations, as their deep pockets 
allow them to outlast an employee during the litigation process.90 If an employer 
has already done a cost-benefit analysis and knows what is in its best interest, it is 
easy to see how a victim demanding that an NDA be included could be met with 
strong opposition. As the above example illustrates, the only real bargaining chip 
a victim has is the ability to take a reduction in the settlement amount. Although 
this is another disappointing aspect of the law that legislators must not have con-
templated, it should not be a huge surprise. After all, this tax reform was intro-
duced only months after the Weinstein scandal broke and was a direct response to 
a particular problem—victims being silenced.91 Rather than holding hearings to 
see the full implications of disincentivizing NDAs, the amendment was quickly 
incorporated into the TCJA, which passed Congress only a few months after the 
Senate Finance Committee’s last hearing.92 
iii. Vague Terms that Complicate Settlements 
The last major concern with this new tax provision is that Congress failed to 
define some of the key terms within the legislation.93 The first issue, noticeable 
from the plain text of the statute, is that a deduction is prohibited for “any settle-
ment or payment related to sexual harassment.”94 The key part that some tax at-
torneys have questioned is the expansive language of “or payment related to.”95 
They claim that this language could be interpreted to include payments such as 
severance pay to both the victim and harasser, as well as settlements for non-
                                                          
 89. This was calculated as 15.8 million less attorney’s fees, accounting for one-third of the settle-
ment is $5.3 million, less tax on the entire settlement amount (assuming it is a non-physical injury) is 
$6.3 million and equals a take home amount of $4.2 million. See I.R.C. § 162(q). 
 90. Janice Harper, What to Expect If You Sue Your Employer, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 10, 2012, 
2:03 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/janice-harper/what-to-expect-when-you-
s_b_1194955.html. 
 91. GORDON & REES, supra note 14; Wood, Weinstein Tax May Hurt Plaintiffs, supra note 14. 
 92. Howard Gleckman, Why The 2017 Tax Cuts Are An Election-Year Bust, FORBES (Aug. 29, 2018, 
9:33 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/howardgleckman/2018/08/29/why-the-2017-tax-cuts-are-an-
election-year-bust/#53dcbfee2eb3. 
 93. See I.R.C. § 162(q) (2017). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id.; see also Julia M. Jordan & Christina Andersen, New Tax Law Limits Deductibility of Har-
assment Settlements: Where Will the Law of Unintended Consequences Take Us, N.Y. L. J. (Feb. 18, 
2018), 
https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/Jordan_Andersen_New_York_Law_Journal_February2018.pdf
; Cooper, supra note 23, at 33. 
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sexual harassment claims that might be tied to the incident.96 It would make sense 
if this language was included to give the IRS discretion in reclassifying settle-
ments to comply with the substance-over-form doctrine.97 However, this is purely 
speculation, because Congress did not define the term or provide any meaningful 
guidance as to its legislative intent.98 This makes it difficult for attorneys trying to 
advise clients in situations involving sexual harassment. While attorneys always 
want to advocate for the most beneficial tax position a client can take, they also 
want to minimize the risk of an expense being reclassified as non-deductible. If a 
reclassification were to take place, not only would the client have to pay the cor-
rected amount, but also a potential penalty of 20% plus interest.99 This is another 
factor that discourages the use of NDAs by employers, and also further com-
pounds the issue of reduced employee bargaining power when the victim desires 
an NDA. 
The possible impact of this complication is again best illustrated by building 
on the example of the settlement between Gretchen Carlson and Fox News. Carl-
son’s harassment suit ultimately led to the resignation of former CEO of Fox 
News Roger Ailes.100 Ailes received $40 million in severance pay from Fox 
News.101 Although the amount appears staggeringly large, this is not uncommon 
for CEOs of corporations this size.102 Assuming that the IRS classifies Ailes’ sev-
erance pay as a “payment related” to the sexual harassment, and that Carlson in-
sists on an NDA for personal privacy, then Fox News is unable to deduct either 
the severance pay for Ailes or Carlson’s settlement and related attorneys’ fees. 
If Fox requires Carlson to foot the tax bill, she would have to take a reduction 
in her settlement amount by $12.6 million ($8.4 million for the taxes on Ailes 
severance and $4.2 million for the taxes on her own settlement).103 After subtract-
ing out one-third of Carlson’s $7.4 million settlement for attorneys’ fees and Carl-
son’s personal tax, she is left with an even smaller take-home amount of $2 mil-
lion, despite her case being valued by Fox at $20 million.104 The IRS would see a 
staggering $12.8 million increase in revenue from such an application of the law, 
                                                          
 96. Cooper, supra note 23, at 33. 
 97. Substance over form, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substance_over_form (last 
updated Dec. 17, 2018). 
 98. Wood, Tax Write-Offs After Weinstein, supra note 23, at 15. 
 99. Manny Davis, 6 Common IRS Tax Penalties on Small Business Owners, ALL BUSINESS, 
https://www.allbusiness.com/6-common-irs-tax-penalties-on-small-business-owners-14416466-1.html 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2019). 
 100. Roger Yu, Roger Ailes steps down as Fox News CEO, USA TODAY (July 21, 2016, 4:19 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2016/07/21/ailes-steps-down-fox-news-ceo-after-sexual-
harassment-lawsuit/87402864/. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See Nathaniel Parish Flannery, Executive Compensation: The True Cost of the 10 Largest CEO 
Severance Packages of the Past Decade, FORBES (Jan. 19, 2012, 5:35 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanielparishflannery/2012/01/19/billion-dollar-blowout-top-10-
largest-ceo-severance-packages-of-the-past-decade/#22eae9597806. 
 103. The tax on Ailes settlement is calculated as $40 million multiplied by the flat corporate tax rate 
of 21% which is $8.4 million. See I.R.C. § 11 (2017); Carlson’s settlement is calculated as $20 million 
multiplied by the flat corporate tax rate of 21% which is $4.2 million. See I.R.C. § 11 (2017). 
 104. Carlson’s attorney’s fees are assumed as one-third of the $7.4 million settlement, $2.5 million, 
and Carlson’s tax is $2.9 million, calculated as $7.4 million multiplied by the individual tax rate. See 
I.R.C. § 1 (2017). 
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collecting $2.9 million from Carlson, $1.5 million from Fox News for Carlson’s 
settlement, and $8.4 million from Fox News for Ailes’ severance.105 
Although this last example illustrates a worst-case scenario, it demonstrates 
how this tax law can easily be applied in ways that significantly disadvantage 
victims of sexual harassment. It is entirely possible that Carlson could decide it is 
not worth including an NDA for economic reasons; however, the difficulty of that 
personal decision should not be minimized for victims.106 As discussed above, 
employers generally have the upper hand in bargaining,107 so if victims are set on 
including an NDA for personal reasons, they will likely have to settle for less. In 
scenarios like this, the real winner of this TCJA reform is, again, the IRS. 
Another surprising ambiguity is that § 162 of the Code does not define sexual 
harassment, sexual abuse, or even nondisclosure agreements.108 At first glance this 
might not seem concerning, but too often the outcome of a case hinges on the 
definition of one of these disputed terms. A court could certainly turn to state 
statutes, regulations, and agency definitions of sexual harassment if it were look-
ing for guidance.109 However, because sexual harassment is generally governed by 
state law, using various state definitions could cause problems when interpreting a 
federal tax law like the TCJA.110 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (“EEOC”) is the only federal agency that has passed regulations attempting to 
define sexual harassment.111 In order to file a sexual harassment claim in federal 
court, the EEOC requires that an individual first file a claim with its office.112 
They review the claim to determine whether the incident meets their definition of 
sexual harassment; only then are you given permission to sue in federal court.113 
Assuming that courts would look to the EEOC’s regulations to help define 
sexual harassment, there are still other issues that would have to be decided. For 
example, assume an employer settles a claim for sexual harassment with a victim, 
but a complaint is never filed with the EEOC. Does this claim meet the definition 
of sexual harassment, even though traditionally the agency makes the determina-
tion? Conversely, should the court simply interpret the EEOC’s regulations defin-
ing sexual harassment without any help from the agency? What if an employee 
files a claim in state court for sexual harassment, but the same claim would likely 
have failed under the stringent requirements of the EEOC regulations? These are 
all issues that may be litigated, but could have been avoided if this amendment 
went through a more thorough legislative review. 
                                                          
 105. Fox News’ effective tax increase for Carlson’s settlement is $7.4 million multiplied by the 
corporate tax rate of 21%, $1.5 million. Fox News’ effective tax increase for Ailes’ severance is $40 
million multiplied by the corporate tax rate of 21%, $12.6 million. See I.R.C. § 11(b). 
 106. Martin, supra note 75. 
 107. Harper, supra note 90. 
 108. I.R.C. § 162(q) (2017); Ence, supra note 10, at 8; Paige Hoster Good, Confidential Sexual Har-
assment Settlement Payment No Longer Tax-Deductible, MCAFEE & TAFT (Mar. 28, 2018), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/confidential-sexual-harassment-17354/. 
 109. See Sex Discrimination & Harassment, MO. DEPT. OF LABOR, 
https://labor.mo.gov/mohumanrights/Discrimination/sex#harassment (last visited Apr. 9, 2019). 
 110. “[M]any states have enacted Fair Employment Practice laws which address and regulate sexual 
harassment on the state level.” Sexual Harassment Law, HG.ORG, https://www.hg.org/sexual-
harassment-law.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2019). 
 111. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1999). 
 112. Filing a Lawsuit, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/lawsuit.cfm (last visited Apr. 9, 2019). 
 113. Id. 
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The term “nondisclosure agreement” is also not defined in § 162.114 Although 
the law was meant to apply to NDAs in the settlement agreement itself, it is un-
clear if this would apply to NDAs previously entered into between the victim and 
employer. For example, assume that an employee signed a broad NDA at the time 
that they were hired, stating that they would “never disclose harmful or damaging 
information concerning the employer.” Could such an NDA be construed to apply 
to a settlement in a sexual harassment case? Victims might be too afraid to find 
out, opting to stay silent rather than risk litigation. With a little more forethought, 
Congress could have drafted language that would have clearly included these prior 
NDAs. For example, they could have defined an NDA to include “any agreement 
that would hinder a victims’ disclosure of their sexual harassment claims.” Unfor-
tunately for now, this will remain a gray area of law until litigation answers some 
of these questions. 
IV. SECTION 162(Q) IN LIGHT OF OTHER TCJA REFORMS 
The TCJA encompassed far more than just the social reform included in § 
162(q) of the Code.115 In fact, the bill has been described by some as the largest 
tax reform in 30 years, including dozens of major changes affecting how both 
individuals and businesses are taxed.116 Although Congress explained their rea-
soning behind each change, they may not have considered exactly how some of 
these changes interact with one another. As alluded to above, there are some gray 
areas concerning a victim’s ability to deduct attorney fees as an above-the-line 
deduction. 117 This would have been less worrisome before the passage of the 
TCJA, as the miscellaneous itemized deduction provided a way for individual 
taxpayers to deduct their attorneys’ fees.118 Although they may return after 2025, 
the TCJA temporarily eliminated miscellaneous itemized deductions.119 
A miscellaneous itemized deduction would have allowed for “individual tax-
payer[s] who took itemized deductions … [to] deduct legal fees … greater than 
2% of … adjusted gross income as a miscellaneous expense.”120 The deduction 
was available to taxpayers regardless of the type of litigation. This option is cur-
rently unavailable to taxpayers, as they are limited to deducting claims that qualify 
as above-the-line deductions.121 Unlike the miscellaneous itemized deduction, 
what qualifies as above-the-line for attorney fees is quite limited.122 There are only 
                                                          
 114. See I.R.C. § 162(q) (2017). 
 115. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA): Which Provisions are Temporary and Which are Perma-
nent, DYNAMIC WEALTH ADVISORS (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.dynamicwealthadvisors.com/the-
tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-tcja-which-provisions-are-temporary-and-which-are-permanent/. 
 116. Id.; Biggest Tax Changes in 30 Years Passed by Congress, FRAZIER & DEETER, 
https://www.frazierdeeter.com/articles/biggest-tax-changes-in-30-years-passed-by-congress/ (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2019). 
 117. See I.R.C. § 162(q). 
 118. I.R.C. § 67(b)(6) (2017); Stephen Fishman, Are Attorney’s Fees Tax Deductible?, 
LAWYERS.COM, https://www.lawyers.com/legal-info/taxation/tax-audits/are-attorneys-fees-tax-
deductible.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2019). 
 119. I.R.C. § 67.2(g) (2017). 
 120. Jia Liu, No Deduction for Attorney’s Fees under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, ROYSE L. FIRM 
(Mar. 20, 2018), https://rroyselaw.com/tax-law/article/no-deduction-for-attorneys-fees-under-the-tax-
cuts-and-jobs-act/. 
 121. Id. 
 122. I.R.C. § 62 (2018). 
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two provisions discussing the deductibility of attorney fees as above-the-line de-
ductions.123 They are limited to discrimination suits and suits involving whistle-
blowers.124 Because the latter is inapplicable, sexual harassment claims must fit 
within the umbrella of unlawful discrimination to be deductible above-the-line.125 
Although sexual harassment and discrimination are conceptually distinct of-
fenses, both federal agencies and courts have been willing to define unlawful dis-
crimination rather broadly. Section 62 of the Code defines unlawful discrimina-
tion as any discrimination defined within over a dozen federal acts, ranging from 
discrimination in housing to discrimination against individuals with disabilities.126 
One of these acts, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibits employers from discrim-
inating based on an individual’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”127 
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Supreme Court upheld the EEOC’s broad 
interpretation of sexual harassment as being a “form of sex discrimination prohib-
ited [by the Civil Rights Act of 1964].”128 
Although it appears that sexual harassment falls under the umbrella of dis-
crimination as defined in § 62, this is not a settled area of law. An argument could 
still be made that the statutory intent of the drafters was to limit this deduction to 
the traditional concept of discrimination, instead of an apparently broad definition 
provided by regulations issued decades after the Act by the EEOC. This argument 
is bolstered by the fact that § 62(e) shows a narrower legislative intent by defining 
discrimination as: 
“[a]ny provision of Federal, State, or local law … regulating any aspect 
of the employment relationship, including claims for wages, compensa-
tion, or benefits, or prohibiting the discharge of an employee, the dis-
crimination against an employee, or any other form of retaliation or re-
prisal against an employee for asserting rights or taking other actions 
permitted by law.”129 
Both the examples listed and the statutory language seem to infer that the leg-
islators were trying to define discrimination as some type of retaliatory act inflict-
ed on an employee, rather than some form of sexual misconduct. Specifically, the 
language “wages, compensation, [and] benefits” is very applicable to employees 
being discriminated against, yet does not appear applicable to sexual harassment 
claims.130 The statute also uses the catch-all “or any other form of retaliation or 
reprisal,” which again makes sense in the context of an employee being discrimi-
nated against more than for sexual harassment.131 If this matter were litigated, it is 
unclear whether the EEOC’s interpretation would be upheld. If it is not, then a 
victim of sexual harassment will be forced to include the full settlement in gross 
income with no deduction allowed for attorneys’ fees paid. 
                                                          
 123. I.R.C. § 62(a)(20)–(21). 
 124. Id. 
 125. See id. Attorneys’ fees for the employers are also deductible above the line as trade or business 
expense. I.R.C. §162(a)(1) (2017). 
 126. See I.R.C. § 62(e)(1)–(17) (2017). 
 127. I.R.C. § 62(e)(14) (2017); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1991). 
 128. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). 
 129. I.R.C. § 62(e)(18)(ii). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
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V. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF § 162(Q) 
The secretive nature of NDAs makes it nearly impossible to gather data to de-
termine the effectiveness of this reform. It is well established that this law was a 
reaction to the use of NDAs in high-profile sexual harassment settlements.132 As 
this article is being written, there are currently two major sexual harassment cases 
headed for settlement.133 One is a class action against the Boy Scouts of America, 
where the organization is accused of improperly handling records of sexual mis-
conduct by volunteers.134 With the organization already considering Chapter 11 
bankruptcy, it is likely to give significant weight to the tax implications of includ-
ing NDAs in any settlement with victims.135 The second case is USA Gymnastics, 
which has already filed for bankruptcy in the wake of the Larry Nassar scandal.136 
Regardless of which case settles first, they will both serve as good indicators of 
whether businesses are beginning to shift their behavior. However, some changes 
have already begun to occur in the industry, most notably with respect to 21st 
Century Fox (formerly related to Fox News.)137 In 2018, 21st Century Fox settled 
a $10 million sexual harassment suit filed by 18 employees without requiring any 
victims to enter into NDAs.138 This is a clear break from the precedent of includ-
ing NDAs in sexual harassment settlements, which was the trend with former 
employees like Ailes and O’Reilly.139 
Although some employers, like USA Gymnastics and the Boy Scouts of 
America, know that the public is watching to see if they include NDAs in settle-
ments, the average employer in a sexual harassment case is not under the same 
amount of pressure. This begs the question of whether there will be different out-
comes in cases hidden from the limelight. After all, only a handful of sexual har-
assment cases garner public attention each year out of the thousands filed with the 
EEOC.140 Because not all employers make settlements under public scrutiny, their 
cost-benefit analysis for including an NDA might look quite different from enti-
ties like USA Gymnastics and the Boy Scouts of America. Companies already 
under public scrutiny are likely to weigh the inclusion of NDAs as being of a 
                                                          
 132. See supra Part I. 
 133. See John Bair, Boy Scouts of America’s Bankruptcy Amid Sexual Assault Claims, LEGAL 
EXAMINER (Jan. 3, 2019), https://milestone.legalexaminer.com/legal/legal-profession/boy-scouts-of-
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 135. Id. 
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Disappear?, FORBES (May 17, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2018/05/17/as-fox-
settles-suits-without-confidentiality-will-nondisclosure-provisions-disappear/#107a9c7cfab0. 
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much greater cost because of potential public backlash that might occur.141 How-
ever, companies not under public scrutiny might be more apt to include an NDA, 
especially if they think that disclosure of the harassment would be more damaging 
to the company than the estimated tax consequences.142 Another factor in these 
low-profile cases is that settlements are likely to be much lower than cases in the 
headlines.143 This means that the inclusion of an NDA might be much more eco-
nomically feasible than in cases like Fox News, where the tax consequences 
would easily be in the millions of dollars. 
This problem is best illustrated by a new example, wherein an employer val-
ues a sexual harassment suit filed by an employee at $100,000. Assume the em-
ployer has had some significant morale and brand image problems, and is willing 
to pay the tax consequences if it means avoiding adding to its existing image prob-
lem. If the victim has not yet spoken out about the harassment, there might be a 
significant benefit to the employer by including an NDA. If the benefits of en-
sured secrecy of the sexual harassment outweigh the tax consequences of 
$21,000,144 the employer may try to pressure the employee into the NDA by mak-
ing it a requirement to any settlement agreement. This example illustrates how this 
tax reform, although a factor in the employer’s decision, may not always be 
enough to cause employers to change their behavior and exclude NDAs. In cases 
where NDAs are included, the entire incident will go undetected, making it rather 
difficult to track the effectiveness of this legislation. 
VI. WHAT § 162(Q) SHOULD PROVIDE VICTIMS OF SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT 
As history has shown, tax reforms can be a subtle yet effective way for the 
government to influence the behavior of employers.145 Few people would argue 
that how Weinstein and others have used NDAs in sexual harassments settlements 
is an area in much need of reform.146 Unfortunately, § 162(q) was only a half-
baked solution to a serious problem. The three issues identified in this article have 
been (1) the glaring problem of a victim’s ability to deduct attorneys’ fees, (2) the 
unconsidered issue that some victims may want the privacy that NDAs offer, and 
(3) the more nuanced language of the statute itself, as well as some key undefined 
terms. 
In the future, the best solution to avoid these types of problems is a thoughtful 
and thorough review of the issue by legislators. Had more time and effort been 
given to review, there is a good chance that some of these issues would have been 
discovered and resolved in the committee process.147 The clearest way to fix this 
problem is for Congress to pass legislation amending § 162(q). Such an amend-
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 142. Id. 
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 145. See Wood, Weinstein Tax May Hurt Plaintiffs, supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 146. See supra Part I. 
 147. The Role of Committees in the Legislative Process, UNITED STATES SENATE, 
https://www.senate.gov/general/Features/Committees.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2019). 
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ment should include: (1) clear wording that inclusion of an NDA only affects 
deductibility of an employer’s attorneys’ fees, not the victims; (2) an exception to 
allow for unilateral NDAs benefiting victims, so that an employee’s bargaining 
power is not reduced if he or she wants privacy; and (3) a definition of “payments 
related to,” as well as other key terms like “NDAs” and “sexual harassment” to 
decrease unnecessary litigation. 
Senator Menendez proposed a bill that would have corrected the main issue 
of a victim’s attorneys’ fees not being deductible if an NDA was included in the 
settlement.148 Unfortunately, the bill died in committee. However the bill, named 
“Repeal the Trump Tax Hike on Victims of Sexual Harassment,” suggests that it 
might have been more of a political stunt.149 Another concern, even if the bill 
would have gained traction in the committee, was how a Democrat-controlled 
House would respond to an amendment for a broad tax reform bill that it never 
supported.150 Although Republicans have floated the idea of passing a single bill 
to correct multiple mistakes throughout the TCJA, this has not yet gained trac-
tion.151 
If a legislative correction never materializes, the next best alternative is for a 
favorable interpretation of the tax law by the IRS. As mentioned before, Republi-
cans have already sent an open letter to the IRS trying to fix the problem by clari-
fying their legislative intent when passing the law.152 Unfortunately, just like 
Menendez’s bill, the letter addresses only the deductibility of attorneys’ fees for 
victims, not the other concerns this article raises with this legislation.153 Even 
though the letter was submitted by Republicans in August of 2018, the IRS has yet 
to issue any guidance.154 If the IRS continues to remain silent, it is likely a matter 
of time until these issues are litigated. Although the letter might prove helpful to a 
tax court in determining legislative intent, this may be insufficient if the court 
finds the text of the law to be directly contrary to the legislative intent—which is a 
major concern.155 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Section 162(q) of the Code may still prove to be an effective reform in reduc-
ing the use of NDAs in sexual harassment settlements. As discussed above, there 
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 151. The outgoing Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee proposed the following bill 
to correct TCJA errors. See Kevin Brady, Tax Technical and Clerical Corrections Act Discussion 
Draft, (Jan. 2, 2019), https://republicans-
waysandmeans-
forms.house.gov/uploadedfiles/tax_technical_and_clerical_corrections_act_discussion_draft.pdf. 
 152. See Letter, supra note 55. 
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are multiple aspects that discourage businesses from including NDAs in settle-
ments of this nature. However, despite Congress’ best intentions, victims of sexual 
harassment are tragically caught in the crosshairs of this poorly drafted and ill-
conceived reform. Proposals by members of Congress to “fix” this legislation only 
illustrate that nobody on Capitol Hill has taken the time to fully understand the 
implications of this law. The legislative process has always suffered from ineffi-
ciencies, but errors of this nature can be avoided if legislators stop rushing the 
committee process and complete a thorough and meaningful review of proposed 
legislation.                                                                                                                                                                           
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